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Summary 
This paper addresses the coordination problems in central government by focusing on 
the Norwegian case. The main research questions are: What are the experiences of civil 
servants concerning the main aspects of coordination in the civil service: horizontal and 
vertical coordination, and internal and external coordination? What is the relative 
importance of structural, demographic and cultural variables for explaining variations in 
civil servants’ perception of coordination along these dimensions? The data base is a 
questionnaire given to civil servants in ministries and central agencies in 2006. The main 
findings are that there are more problems with horizontal coordination than with 
vertical coordination; that generally perceived coordination problems are bigger in 
central agencies than in ministries; and that a low level of mutual trust tends to 
aggravate coordination problems. Thus both structural and cultural factors matter.
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet analyserer samordningsproblem i norsk sentralforvaltning. Følgende 
problemstillinger behandles: Hvilke erfaringer har ansatte i sentraladministrasjonen når 
det gjelder samordning langs følgende dimensjoner: Horisontal og vertikal samordning, 
intern og ekstern samordning? Hva er den relative betydningen av strukturelle, 
demografiske og kulturelle variabler for å forklare variasjoner i de ansattes vurdering av 
samordningen langs disse dimensjonene? Datagrunnlaget er en 
spørreskjemaundersøkelse til ansatte i departementer og direktorater i 2006. 
Hovedfunnene er at det er større problemer med horisontal samordning enn med 
vertikal samordning, at samordningen oppleves som mer problematisk i direktoratene 
enn i departementene og at svake gjensidige tillitsrelasjoner fører til økte 
samordningsproblemer. Både strukturelle og kulturelle faktorer har altså betydning for å 
forstå variasjoner i samordningsproblemer i norsk sentraladministrasjon.
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Introduction 
The structure and working of public organizations around the world can be described 
and analyzed according to two central sets of variables: specialization and coordination, 
both of which have vertical and horizontal components. In his analysis of the US federal 
administrative apparatus, Luther Gulick (1937) pointed out the importance of these 
variables, gave them further content and stressed their dynamic relationship. Even 
though many scholars, such as Herbert Simon, have criticized the definition and use of 
these principles and considered them ambiguous (Hammond 1990), they have 
nevertheless been very important both in scholarly analyses and in administrative 
practice. 
The New Public Management (NPM) movement has mainly been characterized by a 
strategy of fragmentation (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) 
adopted mainly with a view to furthering efficiency and transparency, making roles less 
ambiguous, etc. Vertical specialization or structural devolution seems, however, to have 
undermined political control, for it has both weakened the structural levers of control 
and diminished the actual influence of political executives over subordinate levels and 
institutions. At the same time, increased horizontal specialization, according to the 
principle of “single purpose organizations”, has created challenges of capacity and 
coordination (Gregory 2003). NPM has, however, not only furthered fragmentation, but 
also promoted a number of reregulation measures, such as strengthening the internal 
instruments of planning and control (Management-by-Objectives and Results), 
increasing the use of regulatory agencies and strengthening scrutiny and auditing in 
various ways (Christensen and Lægreid 2006a, Pollitt et al. 1999). 
In post-NPM reform efforts vertical and horizontal coordination problems have 
received a renewed focus in the form of “whole-of-government” and “joined-up 
government” programs (Christensen and Lægreid, 2006b, 2007a and b). In the vertical 
dimension, directing more central resources towards subordinate institutions and levels 
and using stronger instruments of central control have become increasingly important 
ways for political executives to regain political control and pursue consistent policies 
across levels. In the horizontal dimension, measures like cross-sectoral bodies, programs 
or projects are increasingly being used to modify the “siloization” or “pillarization” of 
the central public administration (Gregory 2003, Pollitt 2003). Added to this, a stronger 
trend towards internationalization and regionalization combined with strong local 
government has increased the coordination challenges related to issues that are dealt 
with at multiple levels of government. 
In this paper we will address the coordination problems in central government by 
focusing on the case of Norway. The main research questions are: What are the 
experiences of civil servants concerning the main aspects of coordination in the civil 
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service: horizontal and vertical coordination, and internal and external coordination? 
How do we explain variations in the experience of coordination along the different 
dimensions? What is the relative importance or significance of independent 
structural, demographic and cultural variables for explaining these variations?  
The main explanatory variables used are structural features such as position, 
competence, administrative level, policy area, main tasks and administrative reforms; 
demographic features such as sex, age, education and tenure; and cultural features such 
as mutual trust, role orientation and identification. We will derive hypotheses based on a 
broad transformative approach (Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). The main dependent 
variables will be the civil servants’ assessment of how good coordination is along the 
following dimensions: vertical coordination within own policy area; horizontal 
coordination between different government policy areas or sectors; coordination with 
local and regional government; coordination with super-national and multinational 
organizations; and coordination with civil society organizations and private-sector 
interest organizations. The empirical basis of the analysis is a survey conducted in 2006 
of Norwegian ministries and central agencies. A total of 3,362 civil servants answered 
the questionnaire. 
The Norwegian Coordination Context 
As a country with a large, universal welfare state, Norway has a large public sector and 
there is a relatively high level of mutual trust between central actors and public-sector 
organizations (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). Norway can be characterized as a unitary 
state with a combination of political and administrative decentralization. The principle 
of local self government is quite strong: there are elected bodies at both local and 
regional level and these are expected to make their own local policy without too much 
interference from central government. At the same time, they are also supposed to 
implement policies coming from central government. In Norway the delivery of the 
most important welfare services are delegated to the municipalities.   Added to this, 
there are also government bodies at both the local and regional level that are responsible 
for implementing central government policies, and these also have control and 
regulatory tasks.  
The central government in Norway is characterized by strong sectoral ministries and 
relatively weak super-ministries with coordination responsibilities across ministerial 
areas. The principle of ministerial responsibility is strong, meaning that the individual 
minister is responsible for all activities in his or her portfolio and in subordinate 
agencies and bodies. The only ministry with strong horizontal coordination power is the 
Ministry of Finance, but this power is mainly restricted to questions of budget and 
financial resources and not to more substantial policy issues. The Prime Minister’s 
Office has traditionally been rather small and it has not been a strong coordination 
body, but it has become more important over the past decade, owing to an increase in 
personnel. That said, some ministries, such as the Ministry of the Environment, the 
Ministry of Justice and the Police, the Ministry of Government Administration and 
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Reform, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, do have some coordination tasks across ministerial areas.  
Over the past decade, two development features in the Norwegian central government 
have affected the coordination pattern. First, the NPM reforms have increased vertical 
and horizontal specialization, while at the same time trying to balance this with a focus 
on vertical coordination, mainly within the government apparatus but also between state 
and local government. Management-by-objectives-and-results has mainly addressed how 
superior authorities can control their subordinate agencies and bodies via different 
forms of performance-management techniques and quasi-contractual arrangements. 
This is also linked to structural devolution efforts that have turned public administration 
bodies into state-owned companies and given central agencies enhanced autonomy. The 
problems of horizontal coordination have not been addressed to the same extent, but 
this does not mean that this is not an important problem in the Norwegian political-
administrative system. EU influence on national vertical structural devolution is also 
part of this complex equation. 
Second, Norway’s increased integration in the European Union through the 
Economic Area Agreement has increased the need for horizontal coordination and for a 
unified Norwegian position to be formulated on various policy issues. To facilitate this 
eighteen special overarching committees have been established covering both ministries 
and agencies and different policy sectors. The members of these committees are civil 
servants in affected ministries and agencies. In addition to these special committees 
there is also a coordination committee headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Thus this contextual situation illustrates the special challenges that civil servants in 
Norwegian ministries and central agencies face when handling and assessing 
coordination issues. The Norwegian case illustrates that a number of changes in 
government have made coordination more difficult and that there is an increasing 
demand for both horizontal and multi-level coordination (Peters 1998 and 2004).  
Features of the coordinative reform efforts 
The main goal of post-NPM reforms has been to gradually move public-sector 
organizations back from the disintegration or fragmentation brought about under NPM 
to a situation of greater integration and coordination (Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). 
First, as indicated, fragmentation under NPM has increased pressure for more 
horizontal integration and coordination. Societal problems can seldom be 
compartmentalized along sectoral lines, so increasing cross-sectoral coordinative 
capacity has been important. Second, political executives have been reluctant to accept 
that NPM has led to an undermining of political control. Whether socialists or non-
socialists, many political executives have identified a situation where they are losing 
control, influence and information and still being held accountable as problematic. This 
has resulted in efforts to strengthen central capacity and control, particularly in sectors 
that are seen as political salient. There is an increasing striving for coordination and 
coherence in public policy, and one answer seems to be a return to the centre (Peters 
2005).   
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Third, confronted with an increasingly insecure world, whether the result of 
terrorism, biosecurity concerns, tsunamis or pandemics, national states are seeking to 
strengthen central political control, but also seeing an increasing need for contingent 
coordination and network approaches (Christensen and Painter 2004, Kettl 2003, Wise 
2002) . Fourth, the promise that NPM would bring an overall increase in efficiency has 
been difficult to fulfil, even though some more technically oriented services have 
become more efficient. There have also been concerns about negative effects of NPM 
features, like increased social inequality and the declining quality of public services 
(Stephens 1996). 
A second generation of reforms initially labeled “joined-up government” (JUG) and 
later known as “whole-of- government” was launched, much in contrast to the NPM 
reforms. Its advocates described it as a more holistic strategy, using insights from the 
other social sciences, rather than just economics (Bogdanor 2005). These new reform 
efforts, as a response to increased fragmentation, started in the late 1990s in the most 
radical NPM countries such as the UK, New Zealand and Australia (Perry 6 2004). The 
slogans “joined-up-government” and “whole-of-government” provided new labels for 
the old doctrine of coordination in the study of public administration (Hood 2005). In 
addition to the issue of coordination, the problem of integration was a main concern 
behind these reform initiatives (Mulgan 2005). Attempts to coordinate government 
policy-making and service delivery across organizational boundaries are, however, not a 
new phenomenon (Ling 2002, Kavanagh and Richards 2001).  
The concept of JUG was first introduced by the Blair government in 1997 and a 
main aim was to get a better grip on the “wicked” issues straddling the boundaries of 
public-sector organizations, administrative levels and policy areas. It became one of the 
principal themes in the modernization program of Tony Blair’s New Labour 
administration (Richards and Smith 2006). JUG was presented as the opposite of 
“departmentalism,” tunnel vision and “vertical silos”. In the UK, JUG has found it 
strongest expression at the local level, where it encourages various kinds of partnerships 
(Stoker 2005). Another special focus of JUG activities has been the assertion of 
authority in the form of special coordinators and clearance systems. It is, however, not 
entirely clear what JUG means (Pollitt 2003). Some authors make a distinction between 
JUG and holistic government (Perry 6 2005). The terms have emerged as fashionable 
slogans rather than precise scientific concepts and in practice they are often used more 
or less synonymously.1  
Some common features can be identified. The phrase JUG denotes the aspiration to 
achieve horizontal and vertical coordination in order to eliminate situations in which 
different policies undermine each other, to make better use of scarce resources, to create 
synergies by bringing together different stakeholders in a particular policy area and to 
offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to services (Pollitt 2003). The 
overlap with the whole-of-government concept is obvious. The Connecting Government 
Report (Management Advisory Committee 2004) defines whole-of-government in the 
                                                 
1 There are also numerous other terms describing the challenge of improving coordination across policy sectors and 
service delivery, such as networked government, connected government, cross-cutting policy, horizontal 
management, partnerships and collaborative public management. 
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Australian Public Service in this way: “Whole-of-government denotes public services 
agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated 
government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal or informal. They 
can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery”.  
The scope of whole-of-government is pretty broad. One can distinguish between 
policymaking and implementation aspects, between horizontal linkages and vertical linkages, 
and the targets for whole-of-government initiatives can be a group, a locality or a policy 
sector (see Pollitt 2003). Whole-of-government activities may span any or all levels of 
government and also involve groups outside government. It is about joining up at the 
top, but also about joining up at the base and enhancing local level integration, and it 
involves public-private partnerships. 
One example of whole-of-government structures at the municipal level is the new 
Municipality Act in Norway from 1992 (Tranvik and Fimreite 2006). Another main 
whole-of-government initiative in Norway is the reform of the employment and welfare 
administration. In 2005 the Storting (parliament) decided to merge the employment and 
national insurance administrations and to establish a more formal collaboration with the 
local government social services administration. This comprehensive reform is affecting 
vertical sector coordination and horizontal coordination, as well as coordination 
between local and central government (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). 
Theoretical perspectives on coordination 
According to an instrumental-structural perspective, decision-making processes in public 
organizations are either the result of strong hierarchical steering or negotiations among 
top political and administrative leaders (March and Olsen 1983). And the formal 
structure of public organizations will channel and influence the models of thought and 
the actual decision-making behaviour of the civil servants (Egeberg 2003, Simon 1957). 
A major precondition for such effects is that the leaders score high on rational 
calculation (Dahl and Lindblom 1953), meaning that they must have relatively clear 
intentions and goals, choose structures that correspond with these goals and have 
insight into the potential effects of the structures chosen. 
Luther Gulick (1937) stressed the dynamic relationship between specialization and 
coordination: the more specialization in a public organization, the more pressure for 
increased coordination, or vice versa. The challenges of coordination by organization, 
his main type, were also qualitatively different depending on whether the structural 
specialization was based on purpose, process, clientele or geography. If a public 
administration is, for example, based on the principle of purpose, the main coordinative 
challenge would be to get different sectoral administrations to work together on cross-
sectoral problems, or if process is the basic principle, getting different professions and 
experts to join forces would be a challenge. 
Our approach will be to distinguish between an external-internal dimension of 
coordination and a vertical-horizontal dimension (Table 1). The first distinguishes 
between coordination within the central government and coordination between central 
government bodies and organizations outside the central government. The second 
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dimension distinguishes between vertical coordination, which can be either vertical 
within the central government or upwards to international organizations or downwards 
to local government, and horizontal coordination between organizations on the same 
level. Thus, we address the problem of coordination in a multi-level system. The vertical 
dimension of coordination is more hierarchy-based while the horizontal coordination is 
more network-based (Verhoest et al. 2005).  
 
Table 1 Different coordination forms. 
 Horizontal coordination Vertical coordination 
Internal 
coordination 
Intra-level coordination between 
ministries, agencies or policy 
sectors 
Inter-level coordination between parent 
ministry and subordinate agencies and 
bodies 
External 
coordination 
Coordination with civil society 
organizations/private-sector 
interest organizations 
Coordination  
a)upwards to international organizations 
or b)downwards to local government  
 
If we take the central public administration as the unit of analysis, vertical intra-
organizational coordination means central efforts by political and administrative leaders 
to strengthen the coordination and control of sub-ordinate levels/units in the central 
civil service, like agencies. We presuppose that their authority would be strong. 
Empirically in our case, this is labelled “vertical coordination within own policy area”. 
Horizontal intra-organizational coordination is coordination inside central government 
among ministries and agencies. In this type the cabinet and the PM and his/her office 
are central actors and their authority is high. In our data, this is the variable “horizontal 
coordination between different government policy areas and sectors”.  
Vertical inter-organizational coordination means coordination between the central 
administrative level and other geographical levels. In this type both sectoral political and 
especially administrative leaders are important actors, but their authority is somewhat 
weaker, since central control must be balanced against regional and local autonomy. In 
our data this variable is labelled “coordination with local and regional government”. 
Horizontal inter-organizational coordination is coordination with societal groups, and 
the central actors are sectoral political and administrative leaders and their counterparts 
in the private sector, but this implies a weaker position for the governmental actors 
concerning as far as authority is concerned. In our data this is called “coordination with 
civil society organizations and private-sector interest organizations”.  
The fifth dependent variable used – “coordination with super-national and multi-
national organizations” – will for most purposes be of the horizontal, inter-
organizational type, but in the case of super-national organizations, like the EU, will 
have features of the vertical inter-organizational type, where Norway and its central civil 
service are in a subordinate position. The authority of national government actors will 
be somewhat weaker than in national coordination with multi-national organizations, 
while the national government’s authority will be weakest of all in collaboration and 
coordination with super-national organizations. 
THE CHALLENGE  OF  COORDINATION IN  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT… WORKING PAPER  5  -  2007  
 
  13
An instrumental-structural perspective may also help us understand variation among 
civil servants in their experiencing experience and evaluating evaluation of coordinative 
efforts. Leaders will have a greater obligation to organize and further coordination, and 
they will also see coordination differently to executive officers lower down in the 
hierarchy. This leads to a general expectation that leaders will score highest in their 
positive evaluation of a broad range of coordination forms but also have a relatively 
high score on particularly demanding types of coordination. This perspective also offers 
insights into variations in how coordination is experienced subjectively in different 
policy areas and among officials performing different tasks, because these formal 
features determine how internally or externally directed their work is, how technical or 
non-technical the tasks are, the number and type of stakeholders, etc. 
The second perspective used in the analysis is the cultural-institutional one (Selznick 
1957). Such a perspective views the development of a public organization as based on 
historical traditions, path-dependency and informal norms and values (Krasner 1988, 
March 1994). Actors will think and act according to a logic of appropriateness, not one 
of consequence. The leadership of a public organization will have a central role in 
socializing and training employees, so it will act in an appropriate way.  
The logic of appropriateness is a central feature of the cultural perspective. What is 
appropriate for a civil servant to do is defined by the institution to which he belongs 
and transmitted through socialization (March and Olsen 1989). Common identities and 
high level of mutual trust are central characteristics and make it possible to coordinate 
many activities in ways that make them mutually consistent. High level of mutual trust 
tends to enhance appropriate behaviour and vice verse.  In civil service systems with 
strong vertical sector relations, such as Norway,  civil servants know what they are 
supposed to do and how to act and this creates and maintains trust relations within the 
different sectors, but can also constrain trust and coordination among sectors (Fimreite 
et al. 2007). 
So what could be the cultural appropriateness concerning coordination? If civil 
servants and their leadership are sharing common norms and values, such a common 
culture may facilitate actual coordination. This way of thinking is very much reflected in 
the concept of “value-based management”, which is a central feature of the post-NPM 
reforms in Australia (Halligan 2007). NPM meant increased structural fragmentation but 
also cultural fragmentation, so a challenge for leaders under the post-NPM reforms is to 
bring public organizationas culturally back together again. But pragmatic collaboration 
between public organizations, as reflected in Bardach’s concept of “smart practice” 
(Bardach 1998), may also be seen as a way to overcome cultural differences. Instead of 
primarily thinking about the interest and culture of each single public organization, the 
purpose is to create a common cultural platform that could yield a stronger collective 
capacity. 
We will use three different sets of cultural variables to explain variety in civil 
servants’ experience of coordination. One of the chief variables and one that is a central 
precondition for working together in the civil service is mutual trust, i.e. whether civil 
servants think the mutual trust level between the ministry and subordinate agencies is 
high or not. Another set of variables is the role orientation of civil servants. Do the civil 
servants see their roles as collective, collaborative or coordinational or the opposite? 
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And third, what characterizes the identity of civil servants? Do they mainly identify with 
the central civil service in general or more with their own unit or profession? We also 
add the importance of boundary-spanning skills as a cultural variable, indicating that 
such competence will affect the civil servants’ perception of actual coordination.  
Demography can be seen as part of an instrumental perspective, if we attend to the 
competence that the civil servants bring with them, the systematic recruitment and 
promotion of civil servants and their location in the organizational structure.  It can also 
be connected to the cultural perspective if we attend more to professional norms and 
values. Here, however, we will, use it more as a separate perspective, primarily to explain 
variety in the perception of coordination measures. The focus will be more on where 
they come from and what they bring with them into the ministries and central agencies 
regarding norms, values and competence, than where they are located in the 
organization structure or the administrative culture. The general reasoning here is that 
civil servants through their socio-economic background or their individual careers have 
acquired certain norms and values that are relevant in their jobs. The more specific 
questions will be whether such differences in background systematically lead to variation 
in their experience of coordination. Will civil servants who are older and have a longer 
tenure experience the various coordinative efforts differently to their younger less 
experienced colleagues? Will there be gender differences? And will educational 
background help to explain the variation? 
Data sources 
Our method of studying reforms is based on three main elements (Christensen and 
Lægreid 1999). First, we focus on the response of individual civil servants in ministries 
and agencies by focusing on their perceptions of different forms of coordination. How 
the individual civil servants experience coordination along different dimensions in their 
daily work is the core of our approach. Second, we choose an extensive method to 
cover a lot of ground. In 2006 we conducted a large survey of all civil servants with at 
least one year of tenure from executive officers to top civil servants in Norwegian 
ministries and of every third civil servant in the central agencies. 1,516 persons in 49 
central agencies answered and the response rate was 59 percent. On average there were 
31 respondents from each agency, ranging from 112 in the biggest agency to 1 in the 
smallest. The response rate in the ministries was 67 percent. 1,846 responded in the 17 
ministries, ranging from 57 in the Ministry of Oil and Energy to 284 in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Third, we took a broad empirical approach to the question of coordination, asking 
the executives the following question: “How would you characterize coordination in 
your own field of work along the following dimensions?” We then listed five different 
forms of coordination:  
• Coordination between different governmental authorities within own 
sector/own field of work;  
• Coordination with governmental authorities in other policy sectors  
• Coordination with local and regional government   
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• Coordination with super-national/international organizations 
• Coordination with private-sector companies, civil society organizations, private -
sector interest organizations 
 
For each of these coordination forms, we asked the civil servants to state whether 
coordination was bad or good from on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good).  
We will now first describe the general satisfaction of civil servants in ministries and 
central agencies with coordination along these dimensions. Second, we will analyze how 
we might explain the variation in the different forms of coordination according to 
structural, demographic and cultural features. 
The dependent variables: assessing different 
dimensions of coordination 
Table 2 presents the experience of civil servants in Norwegian ministries and agencies 
concerning coordination of different types. The table gives both the results on the 
experiences of the civil servants working with coordination and the share of the total 
respondents who think that coordination is not relevant for their own work.  
 
Table 2 The experience of civil servants in Norwegian ministries and central agencies of different types of 
coordination. Percentage. N=2876  (average) 
 Good Mixed Bad Not 
relevant 
Vertical coordination within own policy area 52 28 8 12 
Horizontal coordination between different policy 
areas/sectors 
30 37 12 22 
Vertical coordination with local and regional 
government 
17 25 10 48 
Coordination with super-national and multi- 
national organizations 
32 24 7 37 
Coordination with civil society organizations and 
private-sector interest organizations 
24 31 8 37 
 
The table shows the share of the total number of respondents who think coordination is 
not relevant for their jobs. These are civil servants who have internally directed roles 
and tasks, and who have very little experience with different types of coordination. Very 
few of the respondents say that internal vertical coordination inside the central civil 
service is not relevant; the same is also mostly the case for horizontal cross-sectoral 
coordination, while the scores on the three other coordination measures are much 
higher, especially for vertical coordination with local and regional levels. This means that 
many more civil servants are involved in internal vertical and horizontal coordination in 
the central civil service than in various external types of coordination, whether with 
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public or private actors, where coordination is a more specialized activity. For the rest of 
the analysis we will exclude the civil servants who said coordination was not relevant in 
their own field of work.  
In the group of civil servants reporting that one or more of the five coordination 
forms were relevant in their daily work, respondents were most satisfied with vertical 
coordination within their own policy area (Table 3). Overall, vertical coordination within 
own policy area is seen as working best. This is very much a reflection of the 
importance of formal organizational structure, i.e. one main reason for organizing units 
and tasks together inside a ministry and agencies is that they have similar tasks, 
competence and client groups. Gulick (1937) labels this the principle of 
“departmentalism”, or it might also be described as what Thompson (1967) calls an 
organization’s domain. The relatively high level of satisfaction with vertical coordination 
is not surprising given the strong sectorization in the Norwegian political administrative 
system, the importance of the principle of ministerial responsibility and the focus of the 
NPM reforms on balancing vertical coordination and specialization. Six out of ten civil 
servants are satisfied with this form of coordination. Given the strong focus on vertical 
coordination it is, however, rather surprising that 41 % percent express more or less 
dissatisfaction with internal vertical coordination in their own policy area  
Table 3 The experience of civil servants in Norwegian ministries and central agencies of different types of 
coordination. Not relevant responses excluded. Percentage. 
 Good Mixed Bad N=100% 
Vertical coordination within own policy area 59 32 9 2539 
Horizontal coordination between different policy 
areas/sectors 
38 47 15 2251 
Vertical coordination with local and regional government 33 49 18 1488 
Coordination with super-national and multi-national 
organizations 
51 38 11 1799 
Coordination with civil society organizations and 
private-sector interest organizations 
38 49 13 1820 
 
Civil servants are also pretty satisfied with international coordination. Every second 
respondent reported that this form of coordination was good or very good. Given the 
complexities of the relationship between Norwegian central government and supra-
national and multi-national organizations this is a surprisingly high score. It might 
indicate that the coordination system for handling EU-related issues works pretty well. 
Thus, vertical coordination between different governmental levels both internally in the 
state and externally with international organizations apparently works well.  
The other types of coordination on average score somewhat lower. Only 38 percent 
of respondents think horizontal coordination is good between sectors and with civil 
society. This shows clearly that this is a future challenge in a post-NPM reform 
perspective, a challenge connected to one of the most typical NPM features, the 
horizontal specialization of institutions and tasks, based on the principle of “single 
purpose organizations” (Boston et al. 1996). One implication of this finding is that there 
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is a need for stronger “whole-of-government” initiatives in the Norwegian political-
administrative system.  
The biggest coordination problem in the Norwegian political-administrative system 
seems, however, to be the one between central government and local government. Only 
one-third of civil servants in central government report that coordination with local and 
regional government is good. This illustrates a major tension within the Norwegian 
political system between central government specialization by sector and territorial local 
government autonomy. Owing to recent administrative reforms at both the central and 
local levels the problem of coordination between central government bodies and local 
government has probably increased over the past decade (Fimreite and Lægreid 2005). 
On average civil servants report that coordination is good along two of these five 
dimensions. 28 percent do not report good or very good coordination along any 
dimension, 44 percent are satisfied with coordination along one or two dimensions and 
29 percent with three or more dimensions.  
There are also some differences in scores between civil servants in ministries and 
those in agencies (Table 4). Respondents in ministries see vertical coordination within 
their own sector as much better than civil servants in agencies. This may reflect that 
there is a special obligation for the ministries to focus on vertical coordination, while 
that is less the case in the agencies. When the scores are still relatively high in the 
agencies, this may show that the institutional autonomy of the agencies is still influenced 
by a historical pattern of relatively restricted autonomy, even though Norway, too, has 
been subjected to a modified version of NPM, particularly concerning regulatory 
agencies (Christensen and Lægreid 2006a). 
The second variable with differences in scores between the ministries and agencies is 
horizontal coordination between different governmental policy areas/sectors. One main 
reason for this may be that the ministries have a clearer obligation to promote cross-
sectoral coordination and are better organized to cope with it. Agencies have to work 
more through the ministries to participate in such coordination, which may give rise to 
more complexity and problems.  
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Table 4. The experience of civil servants in Norwegian ministries and agencies of different types of 
coordination. Not relevant excluded.Percentage. 
 Ministries 
(N=1125, average) 
Agencies 
(N=856, average) 
 Coordination is 
good 
Coordination is 
mixed/bad 
Coordination is 
good 
Coordination is 
mixed/bad 
Vertical coordination within own policy 
area 
67 33 49 51 
Horizontal coordination between 
different policy areas/sectors 
44 56 30 70 
Vertical coordination with local and 
regional government 
33 67 33 67 
Coordination with super-national and 
multi-national organizations 
53 47 47 53 
Coordination with civil society 
organizations and private-sector 
interest organizations 
 
38 
 
62 
 
38 
 
62 
 
When it comes to external coordination, there are no major differences between 
ministries and central agencies. Civil servants in ministries and agencies have on average 
the same opinion about coordination problems with local government, with the private 
sector and civil society and with international organizations.  
Generally, these five forms of coordination are more cumulative and supplementary 
than alternative dimensions. There is a strong significant correlation between all five 
types of coordination. Pearson r varies between .36 and .68. If civil servants are satisfied 
with coordination along one dimension, they also tend to be satisfied along the other 
dimensions, and vice versa. Thus internal coordination problems tend to go hand in 
hand with external coordination problems, and horizontal coordination challenges are 
connected to vertical coordination issues. This means that there is a lot of overlap 
between the different forms of coordination and this will tend to produce similarities 
between them when it comes to what factors affect them. 
Variations in coordination: structure, culture and 
demography 
We now turn to the question of how to explain the differences in coordination 
experiences along the five forms of coordination. This section focuses on how the 
scores on the different independent variables, i.e. our indicators of structural, cultural 
and demographic features, correlate with the different dimensions of correlation. First, 
we present the bi-variate relations between each set of independent variables and 
dependent variables, and then do a multivariate analysis of the relative importance of the 
various independent variables for the different dimensions of coordination. 
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B i v a r i a t e  ana l y se s  
Structural features. Administrative level tends to affect perceptions of vertical and 
horizontal coordination within the government, but also to some degree of international 
coordination as well (Table 5). Generally civil servants in the ministries are more 
satisfied with coordination along these dimensions than those working in central 
agencies, as shown above.  
Table 5 Bivariate correlations between independent and dependent variables. Pearson’s R. N=1981 
(average) 
 Vertical 
coordination 
Horizontal 
coordination 
Coordination 
local/ 
regional 
government 
Inter-
national 
coordination 
Societal co-
ordination 
Structural features: 
Administrative level 
Position 
Sector 
Coordination ministries 
Coordination tasks 
 
.21** 
.10** 
.08** 
.08** 
.06* 
 
.19** 
.07* 
.05* 
.10** 
.05* 
 
.04 
-.01 
.01 
.06* 
03 
 
.08** 
.10** 
.07* 
.05* 
.10** 
 
.02 
.00 
-.09** 
.02 
-.03 
Cultural features: 
Mutual trust 
Boundary-spanning skills 
Identity own unit 
Identity own sector 
Identity central government 
Identity own profession 
 
.21** 
.08** 
.16** 
.19** 
.17** 
.00 
 
.19** 
.07* 
.13** 
.18** 
.19* 
.02 
 
.14** 
.07* 
.12** 
.12** 
.12** 
.02 
 
.14** 
.09** 
.10** 
.11** 
.08** 
.00 
 
.12** 
.07* 
-.08* 
.08* 
.05 
.00 
Demographic features: 
Age 
Sex 
Tenure in central 
government 
Jurists 
Economists 
Social scientists 
 
.00 
.01 
.07* 
.07* 
.04 
.01 
 
.03 
.06* 
.06* 
.04* 
.03 
.01 
 
.05 
.06* 
.06* 
-.02 
.01 
.03 
 
.00 
-.10 
-.03 
-.01 
-.02 
-.01 
 
-.05* 
.05* 
.02 
.00 
.04 
-.02 
**: significant at .001 level; *: significant at .05-level 
 Administrative level (0) Agency (1); Ministry; Position (0) executive officer, chief of section (1) Assistant Director 
General and above; Sector: (0) Other policy areas (1) Fisheries, Agriculture, Trade and Industry, Oil and Energy; 
Coordination tasks (0) Coordination not main task (1) Coordination main task; Coordination ministries: (0) Other 
ministries and all agencies (1) Ministry of Finance, Government Administration, Justice, Local and Regional 
Government, Environment, Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister’s Office; Mutual trust: (0) Not good (1) good/very 
good; Boundary-spanning skills: (0) not important (1) important/very important; Identity own unit: (0) Not strong 
(1) Strong/very strong; Identity own sector: (0) Not strong (1) Strong/very strong; Identity central government: (0) 
Not strong (1) Strong/very strong; Identity own profession: (0) Not strong (1) Strong/very strong; Age (0) Under 
35 (1) 35-49 (2) 50 and older; Sex: (0) Man (1) Woman; Tenure (0) 5 years and less (1) Over 5 years; Jurist (0) No 
(1) Yes; Economist (0) No (1) Yes; Social scientist (0) No (1) Yes. 
 The dependent variables range from 1 to 5.  
 
There is also a positive effect of position. People in leadership positions are more 
satisfied with vertical and horizontal coordination within government as well as with 
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international coordination. People working in ministries with some kind of horizontal 
coordination responsibilities and people with coordination as a main task are also 
generally more satisfied with coordination along different dimensions, except for 
societal coordination.2 There is also an effect of sector. Civil servants working in 
ministries or central agencies in the area of trade and industry, agriculture, fisheries, oil 
and energy are more satisfied with coordination than other civil servants.3  
Cultural features: There is a strong effect of mutual trust, meaning that civil servants 
reporting a high level of mutual trust between parent ministry and subordinate agency 
generally also think that coordination is good along all five dimensions examined. In 
addition, people who report that the ability to work across professional boundaries, 
administrative levels, organizations and sectors is an important skill in their own 
position tend to have a more positive view of coordination efforts along the different 
dimensions. Identity also matters. If civil servants report strong identification with their 
own unit, own sector or the central government in general they also report that 
coordination is good. In contrast, identification with own profession does not make a 
difference, which is somewhat surprising, indicating that the formal structure is of 
greater significance. 
Demographic features. There is a weak effect of gender, meaning that women tend to 
think that internal horizontal coordination, coordination with society and coordination 
with local government is better than men do. There is also a weak effect of profession 
and tenure. Jurists and people with long tenure have a more positive view of internal 
vertical and horizontal coordination in central government. People with long tenure also 
have a more positive view of coordination with local government. 
Mu l t i v a r i a t e  ana l y se s  
We now turn to the question of the relative explanatory power of the different 
independent variables. The multivariate analyses, summed up in Table 6, generally 
confirm the main pattern revealed in the bivariate analyses.  
 First, the independent variables can only explain a minor part of the variation in the 
different forms of coordination. This is especially the case when it comes to 
coordination with local government, international organizations and societal 
coordination. Second, the most important explanatory variables are administrative level 
and mutual trust. This is especially the case for vertical and horizontal coordination 
within central government, but also for trust concerning coordination with local 
government, with international organizations and with organizations in society. If 
central governments’ trust in the municipalities’ ability to implement national polities 
within the main welfare sectors is reduced, they can tighten the control over local 
government by introducing new measures for control and coordination (Fimreite et al. 
2007).  
                                                 
2 17% of civil servants in the ministries and central agencies report that coordination is their main task (19% in 
ministries and 13% in central agencies). 40% say that coordination is a big part of their task portfolio (45% in 
ministries and 31% in central agencies). 
3 We have also controlled for the effect of different ICT tools, but the effect of ICT on the different forms of 
coordination is rather weak.  
THE CHALLENGE  OF  COORDINATION IN  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT… WORKING PAPER  5  -  2007  
 
  21
Table 6. Summary of regression analyses by structural, cultural and demographic features affecting 
different forms of coordination4. Linear Regression. Beta coeffecients. 
 Vertical 
coordination 
Horizontal 
coordination 
Coordination 
local/ 
regional 
government 
Inter-
national 
coordination 
Societal  
co-
ordination 
Structural features: 
Adm. level 
Position 
Sector 
Coordination ministries 
Coordination tasks 
 
 
.20** 
.01 
.05* 
-02 
.04 
 
 
.18** 
-.01 
.03 
.00 
.04 
 
- 
- 
- 
.02 
- 
 
.06* 
.05* 
.06* 
.01 
.08* 
 
- 
- 
.08* 
- 
- 
Cultural features: 
Mutual trust 
Boundary-spanning skills 
Identity own unit 
Identity own sector 
Identity central government 
 
 
.17** 
.05* 
.07* 
.08* 
.07* 
 
 
.16** 
.05* 
.04 
.08* 
.11** 
 
.13** 
.07* 
.08* 
.03 
.05 
 
.12** 
.07* 
.03 
.07* 
.01 
 
.12* 
.07* 
.04 
.02 
- 
Demographic features: 
Age 
Sex 
Tenure in central 
government 
Jurists 
 
 
- 
- 
.04* 
.05* 
 
- 
.06* 
.05* 
.03 
 
- 
.07 
.04 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
.05 
.06* 
- 
- 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F Statistice 
Significance if F 
.13 
.13 
26.670 
.000 
.11 
.11 
18.976 
.000 
.05 
.04 
8.347 
.000 
.06 
.05 
9.680 
.000 
.04 
.03 
8.905 
.000 
**: significant at .001 level; *: significant at .05-level: -: not included in the analyses 
 
Third, there are also some other structural and cultural features that make a difference. 
International coordination is also affected by position, sector and whether civil servants 
have coordination as a main task. Sector affiliation also affects vertical coordination and 
societal coordination. Boundary-spanning skills have a significant effect on all forms of 
coordination. Identity with central government in general enhances horizontal 
coordination, but also to some degree vertical coordination in government. 
Identification with own sector tends to strengthen vertical coordination within 
government and with international organizations, but also horizontal government 
                                                 
4 Only correlations that have significant bivariate correlations are included in the regression analyses. 
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coordination. A high degree of identification with one’s own unit tends to increase 
satisfaction with vertical coordination internally and with local government. 
Fourth, the effects of demographic features are generally weakened when other 
factors are controlled for. But there are some effects of gender on horizontal and 
societal coordination and of tenure on internal vertical and horizontal coordination. 
Also being a jurist tends to enhance vertical internal coordination. For international 
coordination we can see no effects of demographic features.  
Discussion 
We have first shown that there are quite a few civil servants in the Norwegian central 
civil service who do not see coordination as relevant in their own field of work. This 
could indicate that coordination is over-focused and that we tend to forget that quite a 
lot of civil servants have tasks that are internal and administrative and do not require 
coordination. But it could also indicate that there is potential for more coordination and 
that even internally oriented tasks have common features across the civil service. 
Another interesting finding is that for most civil servants coordination is much more 
about internal than external coordination. 
Second, civil servants perceived quite a few coordination problems in the Norwegian 
civil service, but more so along some dimensions and forms than others; more so for 
horizontal than vertical coordination. They are not very optimistic about the capacity of 
government to coordinate its policies (Peters 2004). One could ask whether civil 
servants are under-involved in coordination and whether public-sector organizations 
tend to resist coordination (Hanf 1976, Bardach 1998). It is interesting that two of the 
three vertical coordination forms score highest on satisfaction with coordination, 
indicating that the leadership’s hierarchical control is easier to organize than horizontal 
coordination, which has fewer instrumental levers of control and where sectoral 
resistance towards central coordinative authority is easier and more evident. 
The main coordination problems in the Norwegian civil service seem to be vertical 
coordination with local and regional government, horizontal coordination between 
different policy areas and sectors and coordination with organizations in civil society 
and the private sector. The first form of coordination problem illustrates the tension in 
the Norwegian system, like in many other, similar systems, between local government 
autonomy and central government steering. On the basis of national laws and standards 
the central government can demand that the regional and local government coordinate 
with central government to achieve national political goals. But regional and local public 
organizations, in particular, will try to use their electoral mandate and elected bodies to 
have their own independent power base and thus avoid some coordination and control. 
The problems of coordination connected to civil society organizations and private- 
sector interest groups are generally connected to the lack of formal authority that public 
organizations have over the private sector. Norway, like many Western countries, has 
developed a strong corporative system since World War II, implying the integrated 
participation of interest groups in public policy (Kvavik 1976, Olsen 1983). This system 
has offered public authorities the opportunity to obtain more expertise and help 
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implement public policy and given interest groups legitimate participation rights and 
increased influence. The corporative system has come under increasing scrutiny in the 
last two decades, partly because NPM tends to see interest groups as special interests 
creating costs and inefficiencies, and it has been rolled back in many countries (Roness 
2001). This development is weaker in Norway than, for example, in other Scandinavian 
countries, but we still see more tension both between government and the interest 
groups and among the interest groups. 
There seems to be pressure for enhanced horizontal coordination to deal with cross-
cutting policy issues in a highly sectorized government system, but also to handle 
pressing policy issues at the interface between local and central government. The area of 
coordination perceived as least of a problem is the vertical one within own policy area, 
reflecting the principle of ministerial responsibility, strong functional specialization and 
NPM reforms focusing on the vertical internal dimension in government. Somewhat 
surprisingly, coordination with super-national and multi-national organizations is also 
perceived as pretty good. This might indicate that the coordination system for EU-
related issues works rather well. 
Third, we have revealed that the different coordination forms represent more 
complementary than alternative dimensions, i.e. there is a cumulative pattern. There is 
substantial overlap between the different forms of coordination, and civil servants do 
not perceive them as independent categories. If civil servants are dissatisfied with 
coordination along one dimension, they also tend to be dissatisfied along other 
dimensions. And positive assessments of one form of coordination go together with a 
positive evaluation of other dimensions of coordination. Hierarchy-type mechanisms of 
coordination, such as vertical internal coordination, have not been replaced by network 
types of coordination, such as horizontal coordination. It is more a question of 
supplementing or complementing. In contrast to what some authors claim (Peters 
1998), strong vertical coordination does not tend to make horizontal coordination more 
difficult. 
Fourth, there is also significant variation in civil servants’ experience of coordination, 
but less so for coordination with local government, international coordination and 
societal coordination. Perceptions of the other coordination tools depend to a large 
extent on structural and cultural features. The most important factors are administrative 
level and mutual trust. There is not only a formal difference but also a real difference in 
the working of ministries and agencies. While 67 percent of civil servants in ministries 
report that vertical coordination within own policy area is good, only 49 percent of their 
colleagues in central agencies agree. Civil servants in ministries and those who report a 
high level of mutual trust between parent ministry and agencies are much more satisfied 
with internal coordination in central government, both vertically and horizontally. Thus, 
mutual trust is not only crucial for the more network-based horizontal coordination 
(Verhoest et al. 2005), but also for the more hierarchy-based vertical coordination. 
Strong identification with own sector and central government in general also tend to 
increase satisfaction with different forms of coordination. If there is a common logic of 
appropriateness and identities across organizations, then coordination is more likely to 
occur (March and Olsen 1989, Peters 1998). Even if there is a positive significant effect 
of position, this is weaker than the effect of administrative level, mutual trust and 
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identification. Thus, we do not find that strategic actors represented by people in 
leadership positions are such a crucial element for the various coordination strategies as 
some authors claim (Pollitt 2003, Jennings 1994).  
Fifth, the effects of demographic features are generally rather weak, but there are 
some significant effects of sex, tenure and education. On the one hand, this is very 
much in line with the general results of broad surveys of the Norwegian central civil 
service conducted in the last 30 years (Christensen and Lægreid 1998, Lægreid and 
Olsen 1978). On the other hand, education as a variable seems generally to be more 
significant than shown in this analysis. This may indicate that coordination is more an 
organizational issue than one closely connected to educational background. 
Conclusion 
The focus of the paper is on the experience civil servants in the central bureaucracy in 
Norway have with coordination and how we can understand these variations based on 
instrumental, cultural and demographic perspectives. Two main distinctions concerning 
coordination were used – internal or external coordination, and vertical or horizontal 
coordination. We started out by showing the often forgotten fact that coordination does 
not concern everyone, but like other functions is a specialized activity. The more 
demanding and the more external the task, the fewer civil servants there are involved in 
coordination. 
We then continued by focusing on civil servants to whose work coordination is 
relevant. Overall, there seems to be a lot of variation in civil servants’ experience of 
different types of coordination. One main result is that coordination seems problematic, 
probably both reflecting that coordination as such is difficult, since it is a complex and 
demanding exercise, involving many actors, but also that NPM, even in Norway, has 
created increasing fragmentation problems and therefore also potential challenges of 
capacity and coordination.  
A second main result is that civil servants are more satisfied with different types of 
vertical coordination than with horizontal coordination. The logic behind this is that the 
political and administrative leadership has more formal levers of control and influence 
in vertical organization, than horizontally, where authority is more ambiguous and there 
are turf wars and negotiations. There is one interesting exception to this vertical picture 
and that is coordination with local and regional government. Here more different 
principles collide – the central hierarchical authority and the locally based popular 
authority. 
A third main finding is that for internal forms of coordination, whether vertical or 
horizontal, there is evidently some variation in coordination experiences. Of the three 
groups of independent, explanatory variables, structural and cultural variables explain 
much more than demographic variables. In these two groups administrative level and 
mutual trust, respectively, explain the most. The first, structural variable shows the 
difference between ministries and agencies. Historically, Norway has followed a kind of 
modified Swedish agency model, with agencies as semi-autonomous bodies (Christensen 
2003). In the mid- 1950s a new doctrine urging the establishment of more agencies 
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stated that the ministries should have broader and strategic policy development and 
planning tasks, while the agencies should have more professional and technical tasks. 
This model has not been implemented in a straightforward manner, since agencies often 
have policy-oriented and planning tasks as well. But our findings on coordination seem 
to indicate that there is a substantial difference in the indicated direction between 
ministries and agencies, where the ministries have more coordinative tasks and also the 
resources and authority to cope with them, while the agencies are further down the 
“sectoral silo” where coordination is seen as more difficult. 
The significance of the cultural variable of mutual trust for coordination shows 
clearly that coordination is not only about structural levers and design but also about 
whether civil servants feel they are working according to the same cultural values and 
norms and thus whether they feel that coordination is culturally appropriate. Krasner 
(1988) states that cultural institutionalization has to do with vertical depth, how 
committed people are to fulfilling certain cultural norms, but also with horizontal width, 
meaning that people in different parts of an institution, in our case the central civil 
service, must relate to each other culturally and think they are in the same “cultural 
boat”. Mutual trust seems to encompass both these elements. 
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18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
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Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
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Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
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25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
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styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
  
 
 
